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15. Parties required 17. When a person may be
16. Joint, several, joint and both promisor and prom-
several promisors and isee
promisees 18. Necessity for contractual
capacity
Section 15. PARTiEs REQUIRED.
There must be at least two parties in a contract, but may
be any greater number.
Annotation
One can not enter into a legal obligation to himself. Debard v.
Grow, 30 Ky. (7 J. J. M.) 7 (1831). See also Cecil v. McLaughlin, 43
Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 30 (1843).
It is essential that there be at least two parties to a contract.
An instrument purporting to be a bond but which does not name an
obligee is Invalid-McKinster v. Eastham, 6 Ky. Opin. 423 (1873).
Section 16. JonT, SEmAL, Jo m n SEVERAL PRomixsoRs
AN PROXISEES.
Where there are more promisors than one in a contract,
some or all of them may promise jointly as a unit, or some or
all of them may each promise severally, or some or all of them
may promise jointly and severally. Where there are more
* This is a continuation of the Kentucky annotations to the Re-
statement of the Law of Contracts. The work is being done by Pro-
fessor Frank Murray of the College of Law, University of Kentucky,
In cooperation with the Kentucky State Bar Association. Other in-
stallments will follow in subsequent issues.
** Frank Murray, A. B., Univ. of Montana; LL. B. 1925, Univ. of
Montana; S. J. D. 1930, Harvard Univ., Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of
Montana School of Law, 1928-1929; Prof. of Law, Univ. of Kentucky
College of Law since 1930.
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pronusees than one in a contract, promises may be made to
some or all of them jointly as a unit or to some or all of them
severally, or to some or all of them jointly and severally.
Annotation
The subject matter of this section is covered in detail in
Chapter 5.
Section 17. WMx_ A PERSON MAY BE BOTH PRoMIsoR "D
PROIaSEE.
A contract may be formed between two or more persons
acting as a unit and one or more but fewer than all of these
persons, acting either singly or with other persons.
CG ment:
a. This Section is applicable to both unilateral and bilat-
eral contracts, and like the other Sections in ths Chapter Is
applicable to both formal and to informal contracts.
b. The rule does not touch upon the rightfulness of making
such contracts as fall within its terms. In a particular case
such a contract might be voidable for fraud or for other reasons.
Annotation
Except in a very early decision-Thomas v. Thomas, 13 Ky. (3
Litt.) & (1823)-the validity of contracts of this nature is unques-
tioned, at least as to the parties that do not appear on both sides of
the agreement. However, in holding the contracts valid, the courts
have frequently said that the same person can not be both an obligor
and an obligee on the same instrument. And since he can not be a
plaintiff and defendant in the same suit, it has been necessary to
ignore his existence on one side or the other. Where he is the sole
obligor, but appears with others as obligees, it is necessary that he be
retained as an obligor if the contract is to have any effect and so his
position as an obligee will be disregarded-Darnel v. Croocks, 33 Ky.
(3 Dana) 64 (1835) (a promise by one stockholder to all the stock-
holders). For the same reason, where he appears as the sole oblgee,
his position as an obligor is ignored and his co-obligor is bound for the
whole-Mornson v. Stocwells Adm., 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 172 (1839) (a
note executed to one of the partners by both of them), Debard v. Crow,
30 Ky. (7 J. J. M.) 7 (1831) (a note which the payee had signed as
surety). In other cases where he is joined with other parties as
obligors and as obligees as where A and B contract with A and C,
there seems to be a tendency to drop A as an obligor and to allow
him to remain as an obligee-Cecil v. McLaughlin, 43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.)
80 (1843), Allin v. Shadburne's Reps., 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 68 (1833) (in
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which it was intimated that the remaining obligor who had to pay the
whole might have some recourse in equity). But in at least one case
of this type, A was held as an obligor his interest appearing as. such-
Qutsenberry v. Artis, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 30 (1864). However, it is to be
noted that because of Section 2128 of the statutes a husband "can not,
in a contract with his wife, occupy both the position of a grantor and
that of -a, grantee" 0. V F & M. Ins. Co. v. Bkaggs, 216 Ky. 535, 287
S. W. 969 (1926).
Section 18. NECESsriy FOR CONmA0uRAL CPAcxr.
No one can be bound by contract who has not legal
capacity to incur at least voidable contractual obligations. Con-
tractual incapacity may be total or may be only partial.
Comment
a. Capacity, as here used, means legal power. The legal
powers possessed by natural or artificial persons can be set forth
only when the various classes are separately considered.
b. It is only when his contractural incapacity is total that
it can be laid down broadly that a party to a transaction cannot
enter into a contract.
Annotation
This statement is axiomatic and merely points out that a failure
to incur a contractual obligation may be due to the incapacity of one
of the parties to the transaction. If there is incapacity, whether it be
total or only applicable to the particular agreement, there is no con-
tract although the transaction is often and improperly spoken of as
a "void contract"
Total incapacity is not common. It has been frequently said, par-
ticularly in the earlier decisions, that a lunatic has no power to con-
tract, but it is now well established that even an absolute imbecile has
capacity to enter into contracts although they may be voidabie--Parrot
v. Parrot's Exrs., 8 Ky. Opin. 682 (1876), Wilis v. Mason, 140 Ky. 88,
130 S. W 964 (1910), Cawby v. Kurtz, 209 Ky. 275, 272 S. W 746
(1925). However, after office found, inquest or adjudication there is a
total contractual incapacity-Pearl v. McDowell, 26 Ky. (3 J. J. M.)
658 (1830). See also Rusk v. Fenton, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 490, 29 Am.
Rep. 413 (1879), Garland v. Rice, 4 K. L. R. 254 (1882), (Gawby v.
Kurtz, supra and Fitzpatrzek's Adm. v. Citizen's Bank & Trust Co.,
231 Ky 202, 21 S. W (2d) 254 (1929).
Partial ineapacity, that is incapacity to enter into certain con-
tracts, is not to be confused with the capacity to enter into voidable
contracts. A voidable contract is a contract and one who can enter
Into such a contract has contractual capacity. In tbis state an infant
has only partial capacity. His agreements in respect to certain matters
are not merely voidable but are void. It was formerly said that any
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contractual acts which have no semblance of benefit to the infant are
void-Cannon v. Alsbnry, 8 Ky. (1 A. K. M.) 76 (1817)-but this state-
ment is clearly too broad and was corrected by a decision which
pointed out the distinction between void and voidable acts-Breckwn-
rzdge's Hers v. Ormsby, 24 Ky. (1 3. J. M.) 236 (1829). However, it
may be doubted whether an infant has power to enter into a contract
of suretyshipt-Wfils v. Evans, 18 K. L. R. 1067, 38 S. W 1090 (1897)-
and an attempted appointment of an agent is without effect--Slusher
v. Weller, 151 Ky. 203, 151 S. W 684 (1912), see also Pope v. Lyttle,
157 Ky. 659, 163 S. W 1121 (1914). A married woman is under a
partial incapacity. She may not have capacity to bind herself by a
contract of suretyship-Ky. Stat., Sec. 2127; Hall v. Hall, 118 Ky. 656,
82 S. W. 269 (1904), Baker v. Owensboro Bank, 140 Ky. 121, 130 S. W.
969 (1910), People's Bank v. Baker, 238 Ky. 473, 38 S. W (2d) 225
(1931)-and she can not make executory contracts to sell or mortgage
her real property unless her husband join-Ky. Stat., Sec. 2128; Brown
v. Allen, 204 Ky. 76, 263 S. W 717 (1924). As to the power of a cor-
poration to become a surety, see Monarch Co. v. Bank, 105 Ky. 430,
49 S. W. 317 (1899), and as to power to make contracts for the pur-
chase of stock in other corporations, see Lithgow Mfg. Co. v. Fitch,
5 K. L. R. 604 (1884), and Louisville & N. R. R Co. v. Howard, 15 I.
L. R. 25 (1893).
Chapter 3
FORMATION OF INFORMAL CONTRACTS
TOPIC A. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
SECTION
19. Requirements of the law
for formation of an in-
formal contract
TOPIC B. MANIFESTATION OF ASSENT
SECTION
20. Manifestation of mutual
assent necessary
21. Acts as manifestation of
assent
22. Offer and acceptance
23. Necessity of communica-
tion of an offer
24. Offer defined
25. When a manifestation of
intention is not an offer
26. Contract may exist though
written memorial is con-
templated
27. Auctions; sales without
reserve
28. To whom an offer may be
made
SECTION
29. How an offer may be ac-
cepted
30. Offer may propose a
single contract or a num-
ber of contracts
31. Presumption that offer in-
vites a bilateral contract
32. Offer must be reasonably
certain in its terms
33. An indefinite offer may
create a contract upon
performance by offeree
34. Offer until terminated
may be accepted
Topic A. General Requirements
Section 19. REQUIREMENTS OF THm LAW FOR FORMATION O
AN INFORMAL CONTRACT.
The requirements of the law for the formation of an
informal contract are.
A. A promisor and a promisee each of whom has legal capacity
to act as such in the proposed contract;
B. A manifestation of assent by the parties who form the con-
tract to the terms thereof, and by every promisor to the consideration
for his promise, except as otherwise stated in Sections 85 to 94,
C. A sufficient consideration except as otherwise stated in Sec-
tions 85 to 94,
D. The transaction, though satisfying the foregoing requirements,




This section states in broad terms the general requirements for
the formation of a contract. Subdivision (a) deals with capacity,
which was considered in the annotations under Section 13, supra.
Subdivision (b) requires a manifestation of assent, and subdivision
(c) makes the general requirement of consideration. Both of these
requirements are treated in detail in the following sections. Sub-
division (d) probably refers to agreements that are prohibited by
statutes or the rules of common law and hence are not contracts in
any sense of the word. Some examples are given in the annotations of
Section 13. This subdivision probably does not refer to voidable con-
tracts, as those of an infant, to contracts based on illegal considera-
tion, or to contracts that are unenforceable because of the Statute of
Frauds.
Topic B. Manifestation of Assent
Section 20. MANIFESTATION OF MUTUAL ASSENT NECESSARY.
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an
informal contract is essential to its formation and the acts by
which suoh assent is manifested must be done with the intent
to do those acts, but, except as qualified by, Sections 55, 71 and
72, neither mental assent to the promises in the contract nor
real or apparent intent that the promises shall be legally bind-
ing is essential.
Comment
a. Mutual assent to the formation of informal contracts is
operative only to the extent that it is manifested. Moreover, if
the manifestation is at variance with the mental intent, subject
to the slight exception stated in Section 71, it is the expression
which is controlling. Not mutual assent but a manifestation
indicating such assent is what the law requires. Nor is it essen-
tial that the parties are conscious of the legal relations which
their words or acts give rise to. It is essential, however, that
the acts manifesting assent shall be done intentionally That is,
there must be a conscious will to do those acts, but it is not
material what induces the will. Even insane persons may so
act, but a somnambulist could not.
Annotation
This section may be divided into four distinct statements
1. A 'manifestation of mutual assent ss essential In Hopkins v.
Phoenzx Fire Ins. Co., 200 Ky. 365, 254 S. W 1041 (1923), a contract
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was not formed because of the inaction of the offeree and it was said
"To constitute acceptance of such an offer there must be an expression
of the intention by word, sign, or writing communicated or delivered
to the person making the offer" Manifestation of assent is required
because, in the language of the courts, "to be a contract the agreement
must be mutually binding" See also Kentucky Portland Cement Co.
v. Steckel, 164 Ky. 420, 175 S. W" 663 (1915). In these decisions it is
admitted that where there is an offer to enter into a unilateral con-
tract the doing of the act is a suficient manifestation. And in implied
contracts, "Such manifestation may consist wholly or partly of acts,
other than written or spoken words"-Kellum v. Brownsng's Adm.,
231 Ky. 308, 21 S. W (2d) 459 (1929). A to manifestation by inac-
tion or silence, see Section 72 infra.
2. There must be an intent to do the acts manifesting assent.
"To constitute such a contract (implied in fact) there must, of course,
be a mutual assent by the parties-a meeting of minds-and also an
intentional manifestation of such assent"--Kellum v. Browning's Adm.,
supra. This requires only an intent to do the act and not an intent
to enter into the contract, and this intent mav exist although the act
Is done by mistake, or induced by fraud or duress.
3. Mental assent is not a necessary element zn the formation of
a contract, except as required by Section 55 (acceptance by act or for-
bearance), Section 71 (when mistake prevents the formation of a
contract), and Section 72 (acceptance by silence). Although the state-
ment is frequently made that a contract is a "meeting of minds", it is
clear that the test is objective rather than subjective and that a con-
tract is formed on the expressed assent rather than the mental assent.
See Mercer v. Hickman-Ebbert Co., 32 K. L. R. 230, 105 S. W 441
(1907), Brenard Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 207 Ky. 566, 269 S. W 722 (1925).
4. Real or apparent tntent that the prommses shall be legally
binding is essential. If this statement means that the understanding
of the parties as to the legal effect of their words is immaterial, it
states the law in this jurisdiction-Brashears v. Combs, 174 Ky. 350,
192 S. W. 482; Bell v. Offutt, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 632; Hartford LIfe Ins.
Co. v. Milet, 21 K. L. R. 1297, 105 S. W 144. But if it means that if
even an apparent intent that the promise shall result in a contract
or legal obligation is unnecessary it is not supported by our decisions-
Smith v. Richardson, 31 K. L. R. 1082, 104 S. W 705 (holding that a
contract was not formed when "the whole conversation was begun
and continued in a spirit of banter and mutual raillery and
was never intended to be regarded in a serious light"), Tucker v.
Sheeran Bros., 155 Ky. 670, 160 S. W 176 (Dictum, "the intention of
the parties must refer to legal relations, and must contemplate the
assumption of legal rights and duties as opposed to engagements of a
social nature"), Przce v. Price, 101 Ky. 28, 27 S. W 429 ("It must have
been the purpose to assume a legal obligation"), Allenworth
v. AZlenwortz's Exr., 239 Ky. 43, 39 S. W (2d) (Statements not made
in earnest and so understood can not be made the basis of a contract).
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This is especially true of contracts implied in fact-Montgomery v.
Miller, 43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 470; Kellum v. Brownzng's Admr., 231 Ky.
308, 21 S. W (2d) 459. In such cases not only must the one receiving
benefits have an apparent intent to pay for them, but the one render-
ing the service must also, and at that time, have an intent to charge
for them-Miller v. Cropper, 16 K. L. R. 395; EvaWs Admr v. McVey,
172 Ky. 1, 188 S. W. 1075, Oliver v. Gardner, 192 Ky. 89, 232 S. W 418.
Section 21. ACTS AS MAmESTATioN OF ASSENT.
The manifestation of mutual assent may consist wholly or
partly of acts, other than written or spoken words.
comment
a. Words are not the only medium of expression. Conduct
may often convey as clearly as words a promise or an assent to a
proposed promise, and where no particular requirement of form
is made by the law a condition of the validity or enforceability
of a contract, there is no distinction in the effect of a promise
whether it is expressed (1) in writing, (2) orally, (3) in acts,
or (4) partly in one of these ways and partly in others.
Annotation
The manifestation of mutual assent consists partly of acts in
unilateral contracts. (An exception to this is stated in Section 57.)
The doing of the required act alone is generally a sufficient manifesta-
tion of assent See Hopkins v. Flhoencx Fire Ins. Co., 200 Ky. 365, 368,
254 S. W 1041 (1923). Whatever the theory, the same may be said to
be true in the formation of bilateral contracts where the mailing of a
letter or the dispatching of a telegram is considered a sufficient mam-
festation as stated in the Sections 64 and 67 infra and the decisions
cited thereunder. The manifestation of assent may consist wholly of
acts as in contracts implied in fact. Tins statement is copied verbatim
and applied to such a case in Kellum v. Browning's Admr., 231 Ky 308,
314, 21 S. W (2d) 459 (1929).
Section 22. OFFEn AND ACC=PTANCE.
The manifestation of mutual assent almost invariably
takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party accepted by
the other party or parties.
Comment
a. This rule is rather one of necessity than of law. In the
nature of the case one party must ordinarily first announce what
he will do before there can be any manifestation of mutual
assent. It is theoretically possible for a third person to state a
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suggested contract to the parties and for them to say simultane-_
ously that they assent to the suggested bargain, but such a case
is so rare, and the decision of it so clear that it is practically
negligible.
Annotati)n
The truth of this statement is assumed by the courts. In Hopkins
v. Phoenzx Fire Ins. Go., 200 Ky. 365, 254 S. W 1041 (1923), it was said
"proposition or offer made in the manner indicated must contain the
essential and material terms of the proposed contract and the offeree
must agree thereto"
However, this statement may not be true of recognizances and
judicial bonds.
Section 23. NECESSriy OF COMMumCATION OF AN OFFER.
Except as qualified by Section 70, it is essential to the
existence of an offer that it be a proposal by the offeror to the
offeree, and that it becomes known to the offeree. It is not
essential thvt the manifestation shall accurately convey the
thought in the offeror's mind.
Cormnent
a. Two manifestations of willingness to make the same
bargain do not constitute a contract unless one is made with
reference to the other. An offeree, therefore, cannot accept an
offer unless it has been communicated to him by the offeror.
This may be done through the medium of an agent, but mere
information indirectly received by one party that another is
willing to enter into a certain bargain is not an offer by the
latter.
Annotation
The general statement is that the manifestation or proposal is not
an offer until it is communicated to the person to whom it is directed.
It follows that acts of the intended offeree which would otherwise be
a valid acceptance do not have that effect if they were done before
knowledge of the proposal. (See also Section 53.)- This question arises
most frequently in connection with rewards and although the rule as
here stated was followed in an early case of that kind-Lee v. Trustees
of Fleimngsburg, 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 28 (1828)-later cases do not re-
quire that the claimant have knowledge of the offered reward at the
time of his performance-Auditor v. BaUlard, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 572, 15
Am. Rep. 728 (1873)-or at least at the time of partial performance-
Coffey v. Commonwealth, 18 K. L. R. 646, 37 S. W 575 (1896). But
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there is a tendency on the part of the courts to make an exception in
reward cases (Williston on Contracts, Section 33) and it is probable
that our courts would apply the rule as stated to other situations.
It seems clear that the knowledge of the offer, or at least knowl-
edge of part of it, may be constructive as where a shipper is bound
by the stipulations printed on the back of a bill of lading although
he did not read them-Lou-sville d- N. R. B. Co. v. Brownlee, 77 Ky. (14
Bush) 590 (1879). However, cases of this sort may be included in the
exception of Section 70 which provides that negligent appearance of
assent may bind the offeree although the offer is not in fact com-
municated.
Section 24. OFFEm DEPIN'ED.
An offer is a pronse which is in its terms conditional
upon an act, forbearance or return promise being given in
exchange for the promise or its performance. An offer is also
a contract, commonly called an option, if the requisites of a
formal or an informal contract exist, or. if the rule stated in
Section 47 is applicable.
Comment
a. In an offer for a unilateral contract the offeror's promise
is conditional upon an act other than a promise being given
except in cases covered by Section 57 In an offei' for a bilateral
contract the offeror's promise is always conditional upon a return
promise being given. The return promise may be in the form of
assent to the proposal in the offer. (See Illustration 1 under
Section 29.) In order that a promise shall amount to an offer,
performance of the condition in the promise must appear by its
terms to be the price or exchange for the promise or its perform-
ance. The promise must not be merely performable on a certain
contingency
b. All offers are promises of the lnd stated m this Section
and all promises of this kind are offers if there has been no prior
offer- of the same tenor to the promisor. But if there has already
been such an offer to enter into a bilateral contract, an accept-
ance thereof, like the offer itself, will be a promise of the lnd
stated in the Section.
Annotation
A promise is an undertaking that something shall or shall not
happen in the future (see Section 2, supra). Not all promises are
offers and hence not all promises are capable of being the basis of a
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contractual relation. In general, but subject to the exceptions men-
tioned in Sections 86-90, only conditional promises can become legal
obligations, for there must be the element of bargain. A promise to
pay a debt already existing and requiring no further act or forbearance
on the part of the promisee is not a contract [Graves v. McGutre, Helm
d Co., 79 Ky. 532 (1881)). Nor does a bare promise to lend money create
a legal obligation-Spears & Sons v. Winkle, 186 Ky. 585, 217 S. W 691
(1920). But a conditional promise on an expressed contingency may
become complete and binding by the performance of the condition-
Graves v. Smedes' Admr., 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 344 (1838). However, not
all conditional promises are offers capable of being made Into con-
tracts by the performance of the condition. This included those cases
often classified as "gifts on condition" A written promise to pay a
sum of money on the condition that a child is named for the promisor
may not be enforceable--Ram v. Sturgeon's Admr., 5 Ky. Opin. 575
(1872).
As to expressions of intent, willingness, or desire, see the annota-
tions under Section 5.
Section 25. WM A ANTIFESTATION OF INTENTION IS NOT
A OFFER.
If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from
the circumstances existing at the time, the person to whom
the promise or manifestation is addressed knows or has reason
to know that the person making it does not intend it as an
expression of his fixed purpose until he has given a further
expression of assent, he has not made an offer.
comment -
a. It is often difficult to draw an exact line between offers
and negotiations preliminary thereto. It is common for one who
wishes to make a bargain to try to induce the other party to the
intended transaction to make the definite offer, he himself sug-
gesting with more or less definiteness the nature of the contract
he is willing to enter into. Besides any direct language indicat-
ing an intent to defer the formation of a contract, the definite-
ness or indefiniteness of the words used m opening the negotia-
tion must be considered, as well as the customs of business, and
indeed all surrounding circumstances.
Annotation
If from the words themselves or from other circumstances the
person addressed knows, or has reason to know, that the words,
although in the form of an offer, are not the expression of a fixed in-
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tention but in the nature of preliminary negotiations they are not an
offer-Alen v. Roberts, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb.) 98 (1910). (The following
words were said not to be an offer although written in reply to an
inquiry as to the sale of the land: "The lands you wish to
purchase, you may have for thirty pounds per hundred acres.
Cash or negroes will answer me. I shall be down in your
country this fall without fail.") Advertisements and quotations
are generally considered to be calls of offers and not offers themselves,
but a quotation sent in reply to an inquiry and with the words "for
Immediate acceptance" is an offer-Fasrmont Glass Works v. Crunden-
Martin Woodenware Go., 106 Ky. 659, 51 S. W 196 (1899). Even if
there is an apparently complete agreement, it may be expressly stated
or mutually understood that it is only tentative or preliminary, and as
such it will not have the effect of a contract-Cincznnati Equipment
Co. v. Big Muddy River Con. Coal Co., 158 Ky. 247, 164 S. W. 794
(1914)-or circumstances may show that this was the intent of the
parties-Kentucky Portland Cement, Etc., Co. v. Steckel, 164 Ky. 420,
175 S. W 663 (1915) (an agreement to exchange mules is not en-
forceable as a contract where the particular mules are not specified).
Section 26. CONTRACT MAY ExIsT THouGH WRrmx
IV-E'M'ORI IS CONTEMPLATED.
Mlutual manifestations of assent that are in themselves
sufficient to make a contract will not be prevented from so
operating by the mere fact that the parties also manifest an
intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof;
but other facts may show that the manifestations are merely
preliminary expressions as stated in Section 25.
Annotation
This section Is In accord with the law of Kentucky. "If the terms
of the contract had been mutually agreed to, and the parties then
made a further agreement to write and sign a paper evidencing those
terms, the contract was valid without the writing"--Bell v. Offutt, 73
Ky. (10 Bush) 632, 638 (1874), Barr v. Gilmour, 204 Ky. 582, 265 S.
W 6 (1924). See also Sprzngfield P and M. Ins. Co. v. Snowden, 173
Ky. 664, 191 S. W 439 (1917), Ho~lerbach v. Wilkns, 130 Ky 51, 112
S. W. 1126 (1908), Grainger v. Louinsville Cornice, Etc., Co., 132 Ky.
563, 116 S. W 753 (1909). "Yet if it is the intention of the parties
that it shall not be binding until put in writing, there can be no en-
forceable agreement until that is done"-Tucker v. Sheernan Bra. &
Co., 155 Ky. 670, 672, 160 S. W 176 (1913). "An agreement to be finally
settled must comprise all the terms which the parties intend to intro-
duce. Generally speaking, the circumstance that the parties
did Intend a subsequent agreement to be made is strong evidence that
they did not intend the previous negotiations to amount to a contract"
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-Dictum in Cincinnati Equipment Co. v. Big Muddy River Con. Coal
Co., 158 Ky. 247, 253, 164 S. W 794 (1914). For valuable dicta and
citations as to oral agreements of insurance, see Continental Ins. Co.
v. Baker, 238 Ky. 265, 37 S. W. (2d) 62 (1931).
Section 27. AUCTIONS. SALES WITHOUT RESERVE.
At an auction, the auctioneer merely invited offers from
successive bidders unless, by announcing that the sale is with-
out reserve or by other means, he indicates that he is makng
an offer to sell at any price bid by the highest bidder.
Annotaton
This statement is law in Kentucky by statutory enactment since
the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in 1928. (K. S. 2651b-.21.) But
this statute apparently made little or no change in the law in this
respect. The decisions cited below are all prior to the effective date of
the statute.
"Every bidding is nothing more than an offer on one side, which
is not binding on either side until it is assented to, and that assent
signified on the part of the seller by knocking down the hammer"-
Grotenkemper v. Achterineyer & Co., 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 222 (1875)
(holding that even in a judicial sale, the highest bidder may with-
draw his bid before acceptance). The owner may withdraw the prop-
erty from sale before the fall of the hammer even over the protests of
the auctioneer with whom there is a contract to confirm the sale to
the highest bidder if the property is about to sell unreasonably below
its market value.-Becker v. Crabb, 223 Ky. 549, 4 S. W (2d) 370
(1928). (No mention was made as to whether the sale was "without
reserve".)
In this state some exceptions have apparently been made in
judicial sales. Although the bidder may retract his old before the fall
of the hammer (Grotenkemper v. Achtermeyer & Co., supra) the com-
missioner is bound to accept all bids and to knock the property off to
the highest bidder [Morton v. Moore, 4 K. L. R. 717 (1883)] unless
he reasonably believes the sale would not be completed by the execu-
tion of a proper bond [Briggs v. Wilson & Muir, 204 Ky. 135, 263 S. W
740 (1924)]. In these sales, the commissioner may reopen the bidding
after the fall of the hammer in order to correct a mistake if all the
parties are still present [Head v. Clark, 88 Ky. 362, 11 S. W 203 (1889)
where the auctioneer failed to hear one of two equally high bids and
announced the sale to the other bidder]. There may be some question
in these sales as to whether the contract is formed by'the acceptance
of the bid by the auctioneer or whether the bid is merely an offer
until the approval by the court [See Beavers v. Nelson, 152 Ky. 31,
153 S. W 428 (1913)].
Although the statement is made that, in certain cases, a bidder
may withdraw, repudiate or retract his bid after the fall of the ham-
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mer, it is clear that the court does not deny the formation of the
contract. The question in these cases is really as to the right of the
purchaser to rescind because of fraud which induced his bid, or even
because of fraud on the auctioneer as in Thomas v. Kerr, 66 Ky. (3
Bush) 619 (where property of another was included, without the
knowledge of the auctioneer, in the goods which he was employed to
sell). By-bidding, at least in auctions "without reserve" is a ground
for rescission-Burdon v. Sietz, 206 Ky. 336, 267 S. W 219 (1924).
As to what amounts to by-bidding see also Osborn v. Apperson, Lodge
F ' A. M., 213 Ky. 533, 281 S. W. 500 (1926), Manuel v. Haselden, 206
W. 796. 268 S. W. 554 (1925), and Newman v. Woolley, 201 Ky. 139,
255 S. W 1050 (1923).
Section 28. To Waox w OFvFER MAY BE MADE.
An offer may be made to a specified person or persons or
class of persons, or it may be made to anyone or to everyone to
whom it becomes known. The person or persons m whom
created a power of acceptance are to be determined by the
reasonable interpretation of the offer.
Comment
a. An offer may give many persons a power of acceptance.
In some such cases the exercise of the power by one person will
extinguish the power of every other person, in other cases this
will not be true. The decision depends-on interpretation of the
offer.
Annotation
As to the attempted acceptance by one other than the offeree see
Section 54 infra.
General offers, i. e. offers made to everyone and capable of being
accepted by anyone, are illustrated by published offers of rewards.
"The offer of a reward in such cases is a proposal on the part of the
Commonwealth to all persons, which anyone capable of performing the
service may accept before the offer is revoked"-See Auditor v. Ballard,
72 Ky. (9 Bush) 572, 15 Am. Rep. 728 (1873). See also Coffey v. Com-
monwealth, 18 K. L. R. 646, 37 S. W 575 (1896).
The offer may be made to a class of persons, as in the case of a
general letter of credit, and as such it may be accepted by any of the
class. For an illustration of this see Xincheloe v. Holmes, Sturgeon &
Co., 46 Ky. (7 B. M.) 5 (1846).
Where an offer is made to several persons and it is apparent from
the offer that it is to be accepted by all, no contract is formed until
all do accept. Burton v. Shotwe7l, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 271 (1877).
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Section 29. How AN OFFER MAY BE ACCEPTED.
An offer may invite an acceptance to be made by merely
an affirmative answer, or by performing or refraining from
performing a specified act, or may contain a choice of terms
from which the offeree is given the power to make a selection
in his acceptance.
Annotation.
Acceptance by the performance of a specified act is illustrated by
Stembrtdge v. Stembrtdge's Adrnr., 87 Ky. 91, 7 S. W 611 (1888), and
Braswell's Admr v. Braswell, 109 Ky. 15, 58 S. W 426 (1900). This
also includes acceptances of offers to enter into a bilateral contract.
The making of the promise is the reqired act as in Carter v. Hall ana
Martin, 191 Ky. 75, 229 S. W. 132 (1921).
No decisions have been found where the offer invites acceptance
by an affirmative answer, or where the offeree is given a- choice of
terms, but it is believed that the statement here would be applied
should such cases arise.
Section 30. OFER M AY PROPOSE A SINGLE CONTRACT OR A
NuMBER OF CONTRACTS.,
An offer may propose the formation of a single contract
by a single acceptance or the formation of a number of con-
tracts by successive acceptances from time to time.
comment
a. An offer may request several acts or promises as the
indivisible exchange for the promise or promises in the offer, or
it may request a series of contracts to be made from time to time.
Such a series of bilateral contracts, depending upon the terms of
the offer. Whether several promises create several contracts or
are all part of one contract is determined by principles of inter-
pretation stated in Chapter 9.
Annotation
A single offer proposing the formation of a number of contracts
by successive acceptances from time to time is illustrated by a con-
tinuing guaranty. "A continuing guaranty contemplates a series of
'transactions. As each takes place, a separate obligation arises as to
that, and to that extent what was a revocable offer becomes an irre-
vocable contract. As to the future, however, death or notice may re-
voke it."--Aitken Sons & Co. v. Lang's Admr., 106 Ky. 652, 51 S. W.
154, 21 K. L. R. 247, 90 Am. St. Rep. 263 (1899) (holding that a. guar-
anty of future indebtedness, although contaimng a recital of a con-
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sideration, is revoked as to future transactions by the death of the
guarantor even if credit is extended without knowledge of the death).
See also White Sewzng Machine Co. v. Powell, 25 K. L. R. 94, 74 S. W.
746 (1902). As to the revocability of the unaccepted part of such an
offer, see Section 44 infra.
Offers of this type should not be confused with offers to enter into
a divisible or severable contract as in Gilmore & Co. v. Samuels & Go.,
135 Ky. 706, 123 S. W 271, 21 Ann. Cas. 611 (1909).
Section 31. PRESUMPTION THAT OFmi INVITES A BILAT-
ERAL CONTRACT.
In case of doubt it is presumed that an offer invites the
formation of a bilateral contract by an acceptance amounting
in effect to a promise by the offeree to perform what the offer
requests, rather than the formation of one or more unilateral
contracts by actual performance on the part of the offeree.
comment
a. It is not always easy to determine whether an offeror
requests an act or a promise to do the act. As a bilateral con-
tract immediately and fully protects both parties, the interpreta-
tion is favored that a bilateral contract is proposed.
Annotation
A statement of this presumption has not been found in the de-
cisions, but it was applied in Ayer and Lord Tie Co. v. O'Bannon & Go.,
164 Ky. 34, 174 S. W 783 (1915). (An offer to buy such ties as the
offeree could deliver before January 1 and part performance by the
offeree, was said to create a bilateral contract in which the offeree
assumed the duty of exercising reasonable diligence in procuring and
delivering the ties and prevented a revocation of the offer.) See also
Loutsville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Coyle 123, Ky. 854, 99-S. W 237
(1906). However, the decisions may be explained otherwise as under
Sections 45 and 54.
We have applied the same presumption to charitable subscriptions
-Collier v. Baptist Soc., 47 Ky. (8 B. M.) 68; Trustees v. Flemmmng,
73 Ky. (10 Bush) 234.
Section 32. OFPPE MUST BE REASONABLY CERTAIN InT s
TERms.
An offer must be so definite in its terms, or require such
definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and per-
formances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain.
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Comments -
a. Inasmuch as the law of contracts deals only with duties
defined by the expressions of the parties, the rule of tins Section
is one of necessity as well as of law. The law cannot subject a
person to a contractual duty or give another a contractual right
unless the character thereof is fixed by the agreement of the
parties. A statement by A that he will pay B what A chooses
is no promise. A promise by A to give B employment is not
wholly illusory, but if neither the character of the employment
nor the compensation therefor is stated, the promise is so mdefi-
nite that the law cannot enforce it, even if consideration is given
for it.
b. Promises may be indefinite m tune or m place, or in the
work or the property to be given in exchange for the promise.
In dealing with such cases the law endeavors to give a sufficiently
clear meaning to offers and promises where the parties intended
to enter into a bargain, but m some cases tins is impossible.
c. Offers wnch are originally too indefinite may later
acquire precision and becomes valid offers, by the subsequent
words or acts of the offeror or ins assent to words or acts of the
offeree.
Annotation.
This section is in accord with the law of Kentucky. An olfer must
contain the essential and material terms of the proposed contract-
Hopkins v. Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 200 Ky. 365, 254 S. W 1041 t1923)
(An application, made to an agent representing several fire insurance
companies, which did not designate the company desired, nor state
the terms or duration of the risk is not sufficiently definite so that
the execution of a "binder" by the agent will complete a contract),
Kentuci y Portland Cement Co. v. Steckel, 164 Ky. 420, 175 S. W 663
(1915) (An offer to exchange mules which does not specify the mules
to be exchanged is too indefinite), Dean v. Meter, 8 Ky. Op. 746 (1876)
(Manner of the payment not definitely fixed), Gaines v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 163 Ky. 716, 174 S. W 482 (1915) (A "nice" or "reason-
able" profit is not sufficiently definite).
This question often -arises in connection with contracts of employ-
ment. If the period of employment is indefinite, the offer and accept-
ance creates no executory obligations and either party has the right
to terminate the relation at any time with or without cause-Bowen
v. Chenoa-Hignite Coal Co., 168 Ky. 588, 182 S. W 635 (1916), Hudson
v. Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P iy. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S. W 47 (1913),
Loutsville & N. R. R. Co. v. Harvey, 99 Ky. 157, 34 S. W 1069 (1896),
Louisville d Y. R. B?. Co. v. Offutt, 99 Ky. 427, 36 S. W 181 (1896)-
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however, notice of termination may be necessary-El horn Coal Co. v.
Eaton, Rhodes d Co., 163 Ky. 306, 173 S. W 798. But in regard to
presumptions as to time of employment when no time is mentioned,
see Smith v. Theobald, 86 Ky. 141, 5 S. W. 394 (1887).
An offer or agreement, although indefinite as to material terms
will not be invalid as an executory contract if the parties have pro-
vided some way by which the terms may be ascertained or determined.
This is true where one of the parties has the right to name the date
of performance within prescribed limits-Bell v. Hatfield, 121 Ky. 560,
89 S. W 544 (1905) (holding that a failure to. name the day does not
avoid the contract but excuses tender). Sousely v. Burns, 73 Ky. (10
Bush) 87 (1873), Chandler v. Robertson, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 291 (1840)
In these cases it is said that when an ultimate day is named it be-
comes the date for performance in case no selection is made or one
party may have the right to select the plan of performance, at least
within limits-Boss-a-ughan Tob. Co. v. Johnson, 182 Ky. 325, 206
S. W 487 (1908).
However, it is generally said that the determination of material
terms can not be left to a future agreement of the parties-Dean v.
Meter, supra. But see Slade v. City of Lextngton, 141 Ky. 214, 132
S. W 404 (1910). (An agreement by city to purchase or renew a
contract upon terms to be agreed on by parties is a contractual right
that cannot be impaired by the state.) Chesapeake & 0. R r. Co. V;
Herrnger, 158 Ky. 267, 164 S. W 948 (1914) (holding that a promise
by a railroad company to construct a crossing at a location to be agreed
upon by the parties is valid and upon failure to agree the court will
determine the location).
It is sufficient if the terms, although uncertain at the time of the
contract, are to be made certain and definite by other future events-
Gasnes v. R. J. Reynolds Tob. Co., supra. (The price to be paid to be
determined by the future cost. Hag2ns v. Combs, 102 Ky. 165, 43 S. W
222 (1899) (payment for logs to be determined by a future market
price as long as the employer is engaged in the business), Kelly v.
Peter d Burghard Stone Co., 130. Ky. 530, 113 S. W. 486 (1908) (Offer
to employ at such times as employee was able to work, but see Louis-
riyle d N. R. R. Co. v. Of-ut, supra, as to promise to employ as long as
employee did faithful and honest work), Mitchell-Taylor Tie Co. v.
Whitaker, 158 Ky. 651, 166 S. W 193 (1914) (An agreement to sell
the number of ties the seller could make within a year is not too in-
definite), Ayer d Lord Tie Co. v. O'Bannon d Co., 164 Ky. 34, 174 S. W
783 (1915) (All ties vendor could deliver before a certain date is not
too uncertain but damages measured by the number of ties controlled
by contracts made before the vendee's breach), .Fugh v. Jackson, 154
Ky. 649, 157 S. W. 1082 (1913) (Agreement to meet pay rolls until all
the coal is mined is not void for indefiniteness), Hurley v. Big Sandy
& C. By. Co., 137 Ky. 216, 125 S. W 302 (1910) (A contract to carry
the personal freight of certain parties free of charge is not too in-
definite), Lewzs v. Creech's Admr., 162 Ky. 763, 173 S. W 133 (1915)
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(Holding that a promise to make an illegitimate child equal with
legitimate children is not void for uncertainty but a promise to make
the child "financially independent for all future time" is indefinite).
It is said that in a lease of minerals where the time for beginning
exploration is not stated, the lessee must begin operations within a
reasonable time-Killebrew v. Murray, 151 Ky. 345, 151 S. W. 662
(1912), Eastern Kentucky Mineral & T. Co. v. Swann-Day Lbr Go.,
148 Ky. 82, 146 S. W. 438 (1912). And where the compensation for.
employment is not set by the parties, a reasonable compensation will
be implied-orns v. Philpot, 12 K. L. R. 557 (1890).
(To be continued.)
